This study used a diffusion chain paradigm to explore the cultural transmission of causally irrelevant tool actions in chains of adult participants. Each chain witnessed an "expert" adult retrieve a reward from inside a puzzle box using a combination of causally relevant actions and causally irrelevant actions. Which of the actions were causally relevant was evident in two of the chains where a transparent box was used. In the other two chains, the causal effectiveness of the tool was hidden inside an opaque version of the box. Results indicated that fewer of the irrelevant actions performed by the expert model were reproduced in the transparent box chains, than the opaque box chains. However, irrelevant actions, although not in their original form, were evident within each chain suggesting that causally irrelevant tool actions can survive within groups of adults. The current article places these results, alongside those from earlier overimitation studies, within a framework of cultural evolution. The proposal here is that the social learning of irrelevant actions is heavily influenced by the interaction between various transmission biases, including frequency-based biases, model-based biases, and content-based biases. It is further proposed that the transmission bias witnessed may differ according to the interplay between characteristics of the model, characteristics of the observer, and the contents of the task.
In the social learning literature, a somewhat curious phenomenon has recently been a focus of intense interest. The phenomenon in question is "overimitation" in which individuals not only copy the precise details of a model's behavior (i.e., imitation), they do so to such an extent that even causally irrelevant elements of a demonstration are reproduced (i.e., overimitation). Although the notion of overimitation has been in the literature for many years (e.g., Nagell, Olgin, & Tomasello, 1993 ) the recent surge in interest was sparked by a comparative study conducted by Horner and Whiten (2005) . In this study, a group of young chimpanzees and a group of preschool children observed an adult human use a tool to retrieve an attractive reward from inside either an opaque or a transparent puzzle box. Before retrieving the reward, the demonstrator performed tool actions that were causally irrelevant to reward retrieval (e.g., striking a false ceiling inside the box). In the transparent box condition, the lack of causality was clearly visible, whereas in the opaque condition the tool actions were hidden inside the box, leading the authors to predict high fidelity copying in the opaque box condition (i.e., imitation), and low fidelity copying in the transparent box condition (i.e., emulation). With regard to the chimpanzees the prediction held, with the social learning approach varying according to causal transparency. In contrast, the children evidenced "blanket imitation," copying all actions with both boxes even when they could clearly see that the actions were causally ineffectual.
Since the original study, tasks of a similar nature to that described above have been presented to children across a variety of age groups, ranging from infancy to adolescence. (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen, & Tomaselli, 2010) . Counter to predictions, these studies have revealed a consistent trend toward increasing overimitation with age, with the majority of 2-year-olds evidencing "blanket emulation" (i.e., performing only goal relevant actions), and the vast majority of 5-year-olds performing both goal relevant and irrelevant actions (McGuigan et al., 2007; ). Indeed, studies have shown that the tendency to overimitate in the preschool period is extremely robust, persisting in conditions where children were (a) directly told not to copy any "silly" actions (Lyons et al., 2007) , (b) allowed to interact with the task before modeling (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) , (c) provided with prior information that the model was unreliable (Lyons et al., 2007) , (d) placed under time pressure to perform the task (Lyons et al., 2007) , (e) presented with task demonstration by either a familiar or unfamiliar model (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) , (f) placed in a competitive context (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011) , and finally (g) when children were alone in the testing room during their trial (Horner & Whiten, 2005) . Overimitation has also been witnessed in children from a variety of different cultural backgrounds suggesting that overimitation is not a by-product of parenting style in Western culture (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) . A more recent study aimed to explore whether children will eventually grow out of the tendency to overcopy by presenting a task of this nature to adult participants (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011) . It appeared that rather than outgrowing this tendency, the level of copying was even greater, with adults showing higher levels of fidelity than preschool children.
Taken together these studies suggest that causally irrelevant tool actions are transmitted between individuals in a dyadic (i.e., one model; one observational learner) interaction. This finding is somewhat surprising as evolutionary theory suggests that social learning can be favored by genetic evolution if it has an adaptive value for the individual, through obtaining information that is costly or difficult to learn (Enquist, Eriksson, & Ghirlanda, 2007; . However, performing suboptimal strategies during foraging for example, could potentially be detrimental to an individual's fitness as resources are diverted away from survival and reproduction. Thus, we appear to have a paradox, where on the one hand social learning should provide a significant fitness advantage, yet the particular way it is implemented, in an admittedly contrived overimitation context, appears maladaptive. However, it could be argued that in terms of cultural spread of behavior a single dyadic interaction is somewhat unnatural. Individuals typically interact with more than one person, allowing for the possibility that in a larger, more naturalistic, group setting irrelevant techniques would die out, leaving only relevant techniques to be replicated. This cultural learning hypothesis makes somewhat different predictions with respect to the fidelity of transmission than recent theoretical accounts of overimitation (e.g., Lyons et al., 2011) . Lyons et al. (2011; proposed that overimitation is the result of a distortion in cognitive processing, with the intentional actions performed by a model being automatically encoded as causally necessary, leaving observers with little choice but to overimitate. If the Automatic Coding Hypothesis (ACE) is correct then we would predict high fidelity copying across the group as each observer would copy the irrelevant actions performed by his or her model fairly faithfully. In contrast a theory centered around cultural learning allows for flexibility in the approach adopted by the observer as his or her prior experience and contextual knowledge could be drawn upon, leaving scope for irrelevant tool actions to die out within the group.
An ideal technique for exploring group-level cultural transmission is the "transmission chain method," first used by Bartlett (1932) , and subsequently by a host of researchers (Allport & Postman, 1947; Bangerter, 2000; Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Hall, 1951; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006; Kashima, 2000; Maxwell, 1936; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006; Northway, 1936; Ward, 1949; see Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008, for a review) . This technique involves the experimenter seeding a chain of individuals with information, or in the case of social learning, action(s) of interest. This is achieved by training a previously selected "expert" to model the task for Participant A, who in turn models for Participant B, and so forth along a chain of individuals in much the same way as in the children's game, "Chinese Whispers" (or telephone). Although diffusion chains comprise a series of dyadic interactions, they differ from traditional dyadic studies in that they allow exploration of the way imitation naturally functions within a social group, although admittedly without the presence of verbal instructions or correction which usually occur alongside imitation. Traditional dyadic studies typically use the identical task demonstration for each observer, and any variation made by an observer cannot be passed to another individual. In contrast, the dyads within diffusion chains are intimately linked, allowing for fluidity in transmission that cannot be achieved with the same number of independent dyads. More specifically, the diffusion method allows an exploration of the possibility of omission, or modification of the actions of interest, or indeed the inclusion of new actions at any point along the chain, thus allowing for a more, if not entirely, naturalistic spread of behavior at a group level.
Although diffusion imitation should be predictable from dyadic imitation to some extent, studies employing a diffusion approach to overimitation have found a somewhat different pattern of performance than that witnessed in the dyadic studies described above. McGuigan and Graham (2010) presented the identical transparent and opaque boxes used in previous dyadic overimitation studies to chains of 3-and 5-year-old children. Of interest was whether irrelevant tool actions would spread at the group level, or whether these actions would drop out of the chain. In the 5-yearold group, causally irrelevant actions transmitted all the way along each of the eight generations of the opaque chain, but fell out of the transparent chain after only one generation. In contrast, the 3-yearolds transmitted some of the irrelevant actions all the way along both the transparent and the opaque chains, although the number of these actions did decrease significantly, suggesting that they may eventually be omitted from the chain. Using the identical paradigm Flynn (2008) found that irrelevant actions dropped out of chains of 2-and 3-year-olds extremely quickly with both the transparent and opaque boxes. The variation in fidelity across chains of 3-year-olds suggests that the particular approach adopted by an observer, and his or her positioning in the chain, may be crucial to transmission. If for example, by chance, an observer at the beginning of a chain was an emulator then transmission of irrelevant actions across the chain would be low, whereas in another chain the early observers, again by chance, may be faithful imitators and transmission of irrelevant actions would be high. Thus, the presence, and location, of even a single emulator in a chain can have a large impact on transmission across the whole group. An alternative reason why the irrelevant actions dropped out of the chains more readily than the relevant actions is that the relevant actions were directly linked to an obvious goal, whereas the rationale for performing the irrelevant actions may have been justified by the observer themselves. This self justification would likely make it extremely difficult for an observer to detect the omission of an irrelevant action, whereas the omission of a causally relevant action may be more obvious to the observer as the task goal would not be reached.
The transmission chain results described above contrast with those from the dyadic studies described above, particularly with respect to the 5-year-olds who were extremely imitative in dyadic interactions. It, therefore, appears that causally irrelevant tool actions can survive on a one-to-one basis, but this survival is less likely at a group level, particularly when the lack of causal effectiveness of the tool is visible. The prediction that the levels of overimitation witnessed will differ between dyadic and group contexts appears to be unique to the cultural learning hypothesis. The ACE hypothesis predicts high fidelity copying across both contexts, as each observer would automatically encode the irrelevant actions performed by their model as causally meaningful, making transmission of these actions extremely likely. The cultural learning hypothesis is, however, more flexible as it allows observers to vary their strategy depending on past experience and relevant task knowledge. It is, therefore, useful-both theoretically and empirically-to examine transmission data on a particular behavior using a variety of complementary approaches. In this way we can obtain more detailed information on the conditions under which overimitation will occur, as well as the conditions under which irrelevant actions will be transmitted. At present the overimitation data that we have with respect to children, from both dyadic and diffusion contexts, is very detailed, whereas information with respect to adults is scarce. This neglect is perhaps surprising as our everyday experience would suggest that adults are often motivated to copy the actions of other people, even when there is no reason to do so, making this age group ripe for overimitation research.
The aim of the current article is thus twofold. First, it aims to present new experimental data exploring the transmission of irrelevant tool actions in groups of adults using the diffusion chain methodology. Second, it aims to integrate this new information with that from previous overimitation studies to provide a more general explanation for the occurrence of overimitation in the human species. More specifically, the integration of the new adult diffusion data with current overimitation data would appear ideal for answering the little explored "who," "what," and "how" questions of cultural transmission in relation to overimitation. That is: Which individuals are observers most likely to overcopy? What types of information are most likely to be transmitted, that is, will causally irrelevant and/or causally relevant actions be transmitted? How is information transmitted, that is, will the observing individual copy the model's actions with a high level of fidelity (i.e., imitation), or will the observing individual attempt to achieve the same goal as the model but through using his or her own technique (i.e., emulation)? By providing an answer to these questions the current article aims to integrate the different facets of overimitation, in both childhood and adulthood, within a cultural evolutionary framework.
Method Participants
Forty-four adults (34 females, 10 males) aged between 18 and 25 years took part in the study (four as "expert" models). Thirtytwo of the participants were equally divided into four experimental chains: a transparent box (drag-slide) chain (mean age ϭ 21 years); an opaque box (drag-slide) chain (mean age ϭ 19 years); a transparent box (push-lift) chain (mean age ϭ 20 years), and an opaque box (push-lift) chain (mean age ϭ 20 years). An additional 12 participants served as controls, six in an opaque box condition (mean age ϭ 20 years), and six in a transparent box condition (mean age ϭ 19 years).
Apparatus
Two structurally identical boxes (20 cm ϫ 20 cm ϫ 20 cm) were used in the experiment, differing only in respect to box transparency (one was transparent and the other opaque; see Figure  1 ). The external faces of the boxes were solid with the only two points of access to the inside being a (2 cm ϫ 2 cm) hole located on the top of the box, and a (2 cm ϫ 2 cm) hole located on the front face of the box. These holes were large enough to allow a thin magnet-tipped tool (22 cm long ϫ 1 cm wide) to be inserted into the box. Each of the holes was covered by a simple defense mechanism which had to be removed in order to access the hole with the tool. The defense covering the top hole consisted of two small sliding bolts, while the front hole was blocked by a small door. The front hole in each box was connected to an opaque sloping tube which contained a reward (a metal star). In order to retrieve the reward it was necessary to insert the magnet end of the tool into the front hole and subsequently withdraw the tool with the reward attached. In contrast, tool insertions into the top hole were causally ineffectual. Insertions into this top hole resulted only in the tool striking a Perspex barrier (see Figure 1 ). The tool actions directed to the top of the box could, therefore, be classed as causally irrelevant for reward retrieval and the tool actions directed to the lower front hole as causally relevant for reward retrieval.
Design
There were four chains in the study, two transparent box chains, and two opaque box chains. The "expert" models in one transparent chain, and one opaque chain demonstrated the drag bolts-slide door technique (method 1), with the expert models in the other two chains demonstrating the push bolts-lift door technique (method 2). A further two groups of participants, who saw no task demonstration, served as controls in an opaque and transparent condition. 
Procedure
At the start of the experiment the individual selected to act as the pretrained model for each chain was brought into the experimental room. Depending on which chain the participant was allocated to, he or she was shown either the transparent box or the opaque box. This first participant was then informed that he or she was about to receive a demonstration from the experimenter of how to retrieve a reward from inside the box. The participant was asked to pay close attention as he or she would be required to reproduce the action sequence exactly as demonstrated by the experimenter for a subsequent individual. The first stage of the demonstration involved causally irrelevant tool actions: tapping each bolt three times, removing both bolts, and stabbing the tool into the top hole three times. The second stage involved causally relevant actions: opening the door and inserting the tool into the front hole to retrieve the reward. After the experimenter had retrieved the reward, the participant was instructed to perform the task exactly as demonstrated by the experimenter. Once this first "expert" participant had mastered retrieval of the reward using the identical actions as the experimenter, participant (A) was brought into the testing room. Participant A was then instructed to "Watch what (X) is doing" and told that he or she would "Be allowed a turn with the box in a minute." It is important to note at no point were any of the participants (with the exception of the "expert") explicitly told that they were to copy the previous participant, nor were they instructed to teach the subsequent participant.
After the expert model had successfully demonstrated how to get the reward from inside the box, he or she exited the room. Participant A was then allowed an attempt with the box. Once Participant A had retrieved the reward, Participant B was brought in and the procedure continued as above until each participant in the chain had had the opportunity to open the box. Each individual, with the exception of the expert model and the final participant, performed two trials-his or her first experimental trial, and a second trial in which he or she assumed the role of model.
In order to obtain a baseline measure of spontaneous behavior, a group of participants interacted with the boxes in a no-model control condition. In the control condition each participant was asked to sit in front of the appropriate box and asked "What do you think you do with this? Can you show me?" The participant was allowed to interact with the box until he or she retrieved the reward successfully, or until five minutes had elapsed. All demonstrations and trials for each of the above groups were videotaped for further analysis.
Results

Interrater Reliability
The data from both the trials and demonstrations of 14 participants, representing 32% of the total sample, were recoded by an independent observer, who was naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The coders agreed 100% on the method of door defense removal performed, and 100% on the number of irrelevant tool insertions performed. Agreement was also extremely high with respect to the method of bolt defense removal performed with raters agreeing on 96% of trials.
Diffusion Chains Irrelevant Actions: Influence of Causality
There was a total of 11 irrelevant actions modeled by the "expert" in each of the four chains: six bolt taps, two bolt removals, and three irrelevant tool insertions. Of interest in the analysis was the proportion of irrelevant actions that was performed by the observers, and whether this was influenced by causal transparency. In order to explore this possibility each of the 28 observers was given an 'irrelevant imitation score' which could potentially range from 0 (no irrelevant actions reproduced) to 1 (all irrelevant actions reproduced). When the 'irrelevant imitation scores' were compared across chain type, the participants in the transparent chains (median transparent ϭ 0.18) were found to have performed significantly fewer irrelevant actions than those in the opaque chains (median opaque ϭ 0.50; Mann-Whitney U, N1 ϭ 14, N2 ϭ 14; z ϭ Ϫ2.81, p Ͻ .01; see Figure 2 ).
Fidelity of Transmission of the Two-Action Method
Of additional interest was how faithfully the two-action method for removing the bolt and door defenses employed by the "expert" model was transmitted down the chains. In order to explore the fidelity of transmission chi-square analyses were performed on the total number of adults in each chain type (transparent or opaque) who employed the same technique of defense removal as the original demonstrator. These analyses revealed that the bolt actions were transmitted with an extremely high level of fidelity in the opaque chains (expert technique vs. alternative technique ratio 13: 1; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ .002), and with a slighter lower level of fidelity in the transparent chains (expert technique vs. alternative technique ratio 11: 3; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ .057), suggesting that causal transparency can reduce the occurrence of causally irrelevant elements of the demonstration. In contrast to the high levels of fidelity witnessed with bolt removal, the technique used to remove the door defense showed low levels of fidelity. In the transparent chains the observers were more likely to perform the alternative technique than that demonstrated by the expert model, a difference which approached significance (expert technique vs. alternative technique ratio 3: 11; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ .057). Similarly, fidelity to the door technique was low in the opaque chains with observers being equally likely to adopt either the modeled or alternative technique (expert technique vs. alternative technique ratio 7: 7; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ 1.0).
Control Group
Of the 12 control participants, 10 individuals successfully retrieved the reward, with one participant in each of the transparent and opaque conditions failing to do so. With respect to irrelevant tool actions none of the control participants performed irrelevant bolt taps, or used the tool to open the bolt defense when interacting with either the transparent or opaque box. Five participants did use the tool to probe into the top irrelevant hole; however, unlike the participants in the diffusion chains, the occurrence of irrelevant actions did not vary according to box transparency (opaque box insertions vs. transparent box insertions ratio 2: 3; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ 1.0). The majority of the control participants did, how- The occurrence of bolt taps is indicated by the coloring of the small squares on top of the schematic box (yϭ bolts tapped; p ϭ no taps). The side of coloring indicates the side of the box that was tapped. 2) Irrelevant tool insertions: The occurrence of irrelevant tool insertions is indicated by the presence or absence of the tool in the top of the schematic box. 3) Two-action technique employed: Bolt defense removal: p ϭ push bolts; ϭ drag bolts; p ϭ no removal; ϭ hand manipulations. Door defense removal: u ϭ lift door; ϭ slide door. 4) Specific to individual chains: Opaque (drag-slide) chain (B): shows a reduction in the number of bolts removed (one vs. two), and a reduction in the distance that the bolts were removed (drawn either full or half way). Above bolt indicates that the bolt was removed using two distinct movements. Transparent (drag-slide) chain (A): above bolts indicates that the bolts were individually reversed back to original starting position. Opaque (push-lift) chain (Panel B): indicates that the participants tapped beside, rather than on, the bolts. ever, interact with the bolt defense, with 10 of the participants using their hands to manipulate the bolts, all using variations of the drag technique (opaque vs. transparent ratio 6: 4; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ .75). This pattern differed from that witnessed in the diffusion chains where participants dragged or pushed the bolts according to the seeded technique. However, The experimental participants did interact with the door defense more randomly, a pattern which was mirrored in the control group with the control participants showing no variation between the boxes for either the lift approach (lift transparent vs. lift opaque ratio 6: 5; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ 1.0), or the slide approach (slide transparent vs. slide opaque ratio 2: 3; Fisher's exact test, p ϭ 1.0).
Strategy Employed
The various corruptions to the model's technique described above suggest that the observers were employing a variety of different social learning approaches to the task. When each observer's performance was compared to that of his or her model it appeared that the approach adopted was either imitative (i.e., those individuals who faithfully copied the approach adopted by his or her model) or emulative (i.e., those who modified the approach adopted by his or her model). The emulative approaches were wide ranging, but appeared to fall within three broad categories: (a) the observer performed less irrelevant actions than his or her model; (b) the observer included, but modified, the actions performed by his or her model (e.g., alter two-action method employed by switching from slide door to lift door); and (c) the observer interacted with novel parts of the box not witnessed in either his or her demonstration, or the expert's demonstration (e.g., probe the door surround). In order to explore whether the speed of task completion was influenced by the strategies employed the time (seconds) each observer took to retrieve the reward was compared to that of his or her model (see Table 1 ). A univariate ANOVA with approach adopted [imitate, emulate (omit, modify, or novel) or individual learning] as a between participants factor, revealed a significant effect of strategy employed [F(4, 33) ϭ 13.9, p Ͻ .001, ϭ .62], with the post hoc Tukey LSD tests revealing that individual learning was significantly slower (M ϭ 69 seconds) than all other approaches (p Ͻ .05 in each case). The post hoc tests also revealed that those individuals who interacted with novel elements of the task (mean time difference ϭ ϩ36 seconds) were significantly slower to reward retrieval than those observers who imitated (mean time difference ϭ 0 seconds; p ϭ .34), and those observers who modified (mean time difference ϭ ϩ8 seconds; p ϭ .05). No other strategy differences were significant.
Influence of Model/Observer Sex
An additional factor of interest was whether the sex of the observer, and the sex composition of the dyads, within the chains influenced the time taken to retrieve the reward. In order to explore whether the sex of the observer impacted on the levels of overimitation witnessed we calculated the difference in time to reward retrieval between each model and observer for each sex separately. This revealed that the female observers were more likely to overimitate their model (mean time difference ϭ ϩ10 seconds) than were the male observers (mean time difference ϭ Ϫ3 seconds). Of further interest was whether the sex composition of the dyads Note.
The first column shows the strategy employed by the observers, divided into imitative and emulative (3 subgroups) approaches. Columns 2 and 3, and Columns 5 and 6 show the mean time taken to retrieve the reward by models and their subsequent observers in each category for the transparent and opaque boxes respectively. Columns 4 and 7 show the mean difference in time to reward retrieval between the models and observers for the transparent and opaque boxes (a negative difference indicates that the observer was quicker than the model, a positive difference indicates that the observer was slower than the model). The table also shows the time taken to reward retrieval for the control participants. Ranges and N for each category are provided in parentheses.
influenced the level of overimitation witnessed. In order to explore this possibility, the dyads were broken down into either same sex pairings (only female-female data available), or opposite sex (male-female and female-male pairings), and the difference in time to reward retrieval between each model and observer for each pair type calculated. This revealed that the female observers were slower to reward retrieval than their model irrespective of whether the model was male or female. However, there were differences between the models with female observers taking longer to retrieve the reward when observing a female model (mean time difference ϭ ϩ11 seconds), than a male model (mean time difference ϭ ϩ1 second). This contrasts with the pattern witnessed with the male observers who were quicker to reward retrieval than their female models (mean time difference ϭ Ϫ3 seconds).
Discussion
The current study aimed to use the diffusion chain paradigm to explore whether irrelevant tool actions would be transmitted across groups of adult participants. The results suggest that participants in the transparent box chains (where the lack of causal effect of the tool was visible) performed significantly less of the irrelevant tool actions demonstrated by the "expert" model than those in the opaque box chains. Curiously the decrease in the number of the expert's irrelevant tool actions did not result in a complete omission of the irrelevant actions in the transparent chains, as was evident in chains of child participants in earlier studies (e.g., McGuigan & Graham, 2010) . Instead various corruptions to the irrelevant actions arose, and subsequently spread, within the chains. These corruptions may have resulted from the observer having no external goal with which to compare the causally irrelevant actions, which contrasts with the relevant actions which should be self-correcting as errors would result in the observer failing to obtain the reward. The argument made here is that the nature of the strategies employed by the participants tells us much about the "what," the "how," and the "who" of cultural transmission of irrelevant actions in adult populations.
What?
Of initial interest was "what" actions were transmitted along the chains? Would groups of adult humans copy irrelevant tool actions with high levels of fidelity, or would we see a reduction in the number of irrelevant actions performed across the chains? This question can be tackled in two ways, first of all by looking to see which of the actions performed by the "expert" model were copied by subsequent participants in the chain, and second, by looking to see whether any corruptions were introduced, and subsequently transmitted, within the chain. With respect to the expert model's irrelevant actions we see a clear decrease across chains, particularly in those containing the transparent box. This decrease would appear to suggest that irrelevant actions are eliminated from chains of adult participants, albeit more quickly with the transparent box. The reduction in fidelity within the transparent chains would appear to contradict the notion that irrelevant actions are encoded automatically as suggested by Lyons et al. (2007 Lyons et al. ( , 2011 . Perhaps the reduction in fidelity in the current study was due to adults increased sensitivity to causal relationships overriding the automatic coding process, a claim which is supported by the high levels of fidelity in the opaque chains where the causality of the actions was unclear. However, looking at the reproduction of the expert's actions alone does not tell the complete story. In only one chain (opaque drag-slide) was the average time taken to retrieve the reward across the chain less than that taken by the expert model, suggesting that the groups of adult participants were for the most part not reducing the number of irrelevant actions performed. Instead, across all four chains many corruptions to the irrelevant actions arose, and subsequently spread, within the chains. Some corruptions reduced the number of irrelevant actions performed (e.g., omitting irrelevant tool insertions), some corruptions increased the number of irrelevant actions performed (e.g., repeating actions), and some had a more neutral influence on the task (e.g., changes to the two-action method employed). Corruptions of each type, surprisingly even those that increased the number of irrelevancies, spread extensively within the chains, suggesting that irrelevant tool actions, although not necessarily in their original form, can survive within groups of adult participants.
How?
As well as exploring the "what" of cultural transmission we were also interested in the "how" of cultural transmission. It is clear from the above discussion that although irrelevant actions spread along each of the four diffusion chains, the form of these actions changed, suggesting that various different social learning mechanisms may have been in operation. When looking at the approaches adopted, the participants ranged from those individuals who faithfully copied the model's actions, to a small minority of individuals who modified the task demonstration by incorporating novel actions into the task. In between these two extremes, the majority of the group, were individuals who modified the actions performed by the model in some way. An interesting question, which has yet to be fully explored, is whether there are cultural differences in the extent to which functional actions are transmitted between individuals. In a preliminary exploration Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010) found that children from both Western and Non-Western cultures were highly imitative. However, it has yet to be determined whether increasing age, and enculturation influence overimitation in Non-Western cultures, a question which is ripe for future research.
In the current Western sample, those individuals who modified the model's actions appeared to be employing an emulative approach to the task. At a broad level, emulation can be used to describe instances in which an individual uses his or her own technique, rather than that of a model, to achieve a desired outcome. The two main senses of emulation which have been distinguished in the literature are: (a) end-state emulation, and (b) affordance learning (AL), with AL including a subcategory termed object movement reenactment (OMR; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009 ). End-state emulation occurs when the observer copies only the end-state of what the model has done, in this case open the door defense and retrieve the reward. This approach was infrequent across the adult groups, with only one participant adopting this strategy. There was, however, some evidence of OMR in the techniques used by the participants to open the bolt defense. OMR is the sense of emulation which describes those instances where an observer learns how an object, or part of an object, moves (Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 1999) .
In the case of the bolt defense many of the participants removed the bolt(s) in one continuous movement from the same side as that demonstrated by the model. If these participants had been learning about affordances-that is, learning about the properties of objects-then we may have expected more random manipulations of the bolts from either end or middle, or by removing them using a series of movements. However, the distinction between OMR and AL in the case of the bolt defense is subtle, and either or both of these strategies may have been in operation.
The range of social learning approaches with which the observer's tackled the current task suggests that many were engaging in selective imitation. Selective imitation has been proposed to fall on a copying continuum with imitation, or high fidelity copying, at one extreme and emulation at the other (Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004 ). Whiten et al.'s (2004) model proposes that when an observer emulates, he or she selects out actions from the demonstration on the basis of perceiving the actions as accidental, noncausal, or because he or she knows a better approach to the task. Alternatively an observer could imitate by selecting actions in, and copy the demonstration with high fidelity. The current results add to this model by suggesting that, as well as actions being selected in and copied exactly as produced by the model, actions can also be selected in, but modified in some way. This form of action selection in the current task would appear to be best described as "overemulation" where individuals include irrelevant actions but use an alternative technique to that used by the model. Thus, it is not simply the case that imitation corresponds to actions selected in, and emulation corresponds to actions selected out, rather the story is more complex, with observers combining observational learning with their unique individual learning processes. The finding that the observers modified the irrelevant actions (i.e., overemulated) suggests that they understood that the actions were causally irrelevant, yet they continued to copy them in some form.
Who?
Although the main focus of the current research was the "what" and the "how" of cultural transmission, the current study may also shed some preliminary light on the "who" of social learning. That is: Which individuals are most, or indeed least, likely to be copied by an observer? One factor which appeared to influence the occurrence of overimitation was the sex of the model, for across the four chains on the occasions where a male acted as a model for a female observer, the vast majority of the female observers imitated his actions exactly, or made only a minor modification to the actions performed, whereas in instances where a female modeled for a female observer, the time taken to retrieve the reward was substantially increased. This suggests that the female observers were more likely to copy precisely the irrelevant tool actions performed by a male model than a female model, perhaps due to males being seen as more experienced with tools, and subsequently as more reliable models. In support of this claim, studies from social psychology have shown that females are more likely to conform than males, particularly in tasks where women have less familiarity and expertise (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 1991) . Alternatively, it may be the case that females are generally more empathetic than males (e.g., Lever, 1978) which leads females to copy other individuals more readily. This theory is supported by the finding that female observers did not omit the irrelevant actions after viewing either a male or female model, perhaps as a result of increased empathetic concern leading to the female observers focusing more on the actions of the model than the male observers. The greater degree of imitativeness shown by the female observers may also be the result of differences between the sexes in the interpretation of the task goal. Perhaps females were more likely to make the inference that they should "do as I do," possibly as a result of past experience in copying games, whereas males may have been more object goal orientated. Whatever the source of the difference between the male and female observers it appears that the participants weren't copying blindly, instead they were selectively imitating on the basis of sex. Intriguingly, the point at which chains of 3-and 5-year-old children corrupted was also in instances comprised of opposite sex pairings (McGuigan & Graham, 2010) , suggesting that the ability to discriminate between different sex models arises early in development.
These results suggest that the tendency to overcopy can be reduced in some circumstances, depending on the sex composition of the model-observer pairing. Looking at the overimitation research more broadly suggests that model sex is not the only mediating factor, it appears that the age of the model may influence overimitation also. In the current study, the age of the participants in the chain had little influence, with neither the oldest nor the youngest participants adopting a particular strategy, perhaps as a result of the small age range of the participants. However, the results from dyadic overimitation studies suggest that model age, if it is substantially different from that of the observer, can have an effect. McGuigan et al. (2011) compared the levels of overimitation performed by 3-and 5-year-old children, and adults when viewing either a 5-year-old child model, or a 30-year-old adult model. The results demonstrated that all three age groups were highly imitative of the adult model, whereas the adults and the 3-year-olds were extremely reluctant to imitate the irrelevant tool actions performed by the child model. In contrast, the 5-yearolds were fairly imitative of the child model, perhaps because they were most similar to themselves, or because 5-year-olds have a general tendency to overimitate irrespective of the age of the model. The level of fidelity with which the 5-year-olds reproduced irrelevant actions in a dyadic context was somewhat higher than that witnessed in the diffusion chains of McGuigan and Graham (2010) . In the dyadic context 92% of the participants performed part of the irrelevant action sequence demonstrated by the model (McGuigan et al., 2011) , whereas in the transparent box diffusion chain the irrelevant actions were imitated exactly by the first participant in the chain before being omitted entirely from the chain by the second participant (McGuigan & Graham, 2010) . Thus, of the two individuals in the chain who witnessed irrelevant actions in his or her demonstration, only one (50% of participants) reproduced them. One procedural difference between the studies which may have led to this difference is the number of times the task was demonstrated for the observer (five demonstrations typical in dyadic studies, vs. one demonstration in diffusion study), with a greater number of demonstrations perhaps suggesting that the model intends the observer to perform the actions. In support of this suggestion the number of task demonstrations provided influenced the extent to which adult participants imitated the two-action method used to open an artificial fruit (Custance, PratoPrevide, Spiezio, Rigamonti, & Poli, 2006; Horowitz, 2003) .
Overimitation Summary
Thus, the question of whether an individual will overimitate is a complex one, which appears to be influenced by aspects of the task, the age and sex of the model, as well as the age of the observer. This variation in performance suggests that the level of overimitation displayed by observers is heavily influenced by cultural learning, a finding which departs from the blanket imitation predicted by the theory of automatic coding. It appears for the most part adults are highly imitative of each other, leading to the inclusion of irrelevant tool actions in both dyadic and diffusion chain contexts. The switch from overimitation to overemulation witnessed in the diffusion chains suggests that overimitation in groups of adults may be mediated by the age, and sex of the model, as well as by the number of task demonstrations provided. Twoyear-olds on the other hand are reluctant to include irrelevant tool actions in their reproductions irrespective of whether they observed an adult model in a dyadic interaction, or a same age peer in a diffusion chain context (Flynn, 2008; ). This lack of discrimination suggests the following developmental trajectory for overimitation. Early in development children may lack the cognitive sophistication, or motivation, required to overimitate, possibly through failing to read the intentions of the model. It also appears that these young children are not yet discriminating between different models. However, by 3-years of age children are clearly capable of both overimitating, and selecting particular models to copy. Crucially, it appears that this tendency to overimitate increases with age, as does the ability to make discriminations between different models, perhaps as a result of increasing exposure to a variety of individuals displaying different cultural variants. This combination of high fidelity copying, plus selectivity based on characteristics of the model is likely to provide observers with an extremely powerful capacity for learning adaptive cultural traits.
Influence of Transmission Biases
It is clear from the above discussion that there are many potential influences on the likelihood that an observer will overimitate. The question of interest is how we could put these apparently diverse set of data into an overarching framework? A useful way of looking at the data is to consider them within a framework of cultural evolution. The diversity of behaviors witnessed within human societies across the world suggests that culture may be adaptive, in the sense of benefiting survival and reproduction (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) . However, coupled with the notion of adaptive culture is the widespread tendency of the human species to perform actions that, on the surface, often appear dysfunctional, or maladaptive, as would appear to be the case with overimitation. In response to this paradox, Richerson and Boyd (2005) proposed that the human adaptation for culture operates on a general level, which although extremely useful in most contexts, poses a problem in that what we gain in generality, we may have to give up in accuracy, leading observers to copy maladaptive traits. For this reason Richerson and Boyd (2005) proposed that evolution has favored psychological mechanisms that provide "fast and frugal heuristics" to aid observers in acquiring only those cultural traits that are adaptive. The proposal made here is that these heuristics can be usefully applied to the overimitation data in order to provide an explanation for the situations in which observers overcopy, or opt to act more selectively. Fundamental to the argument is that overimitation only appears maladaptive. Rather it is an overextension of a highly adaptive capacity for acquiring culture. Henrich and McElreath (2007) extended this reasoning by suggesting that an adaptive propensity toward imitation has evolved within the human species as observers are often unsure which particular element of a model's behavior is causally related to the model's success or competence. This uncertainty leads individuals to overcopy in some instances, and subsequently acquire maladaptive traits. Richerson and Boyd (2005) termed the above heuristics, transmission biases, which are proposed to fall into three different categories. First, content-based biases allow observers to learn a particular cultural trait on the basis of its content, perhaps through comparing the costs and benefits with those of alternative traits. Frequency-based biases on the other hand allow observers to make a choice between traits according to the frequency of a cultural trait in a population. A frequency based approach is often a useful strategy as the most adaptive trait is also likely to be the most common trait. Therefore, by adopting the most frequent trait the observer has an easy route to success. Finally, model-based biases, or what has been termed context biases by others (e.g., Henrich & McElreath, 2007) , allow observers to make a choice of which trait to copy based on characteristics of the model, with potential biases of this nature including copying prestigious and competent individuals (Henrich & McElreath, 2007) , as well as individuals who are successful and similar to oneself (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) .
When we take together the overimitation studies described above, we can see that many of these biases appear to be in operation. In relation to content-based biases, both children and adults, with the exception of 2-year-olds, were more likely to reproduce both the causally relevant and irrelevant actions, than the causally relevant actions only. That the older children and adults performed in this way suggests that they may be operating according to a "conformist bias" where the most common trait in a population (i.e., that provided by the model) was adopted. The adoption of a conformity bias may also serve an important social function as a group of individuals adopting the same behavior will be well defined in terms of group membership, as well as being more socially cohesive. Combined with an increasing tendency toward conformity, appears to be an increasing ability to select particular models to copy on the basis of them having particular characteristics of value. One key characteristic of the model in relation to overimitation appears to be the age of the model, with observers operating according to an "expertise bias," in which only older, more reliable, models are copied. The exception to this was the 5-year-olds who were highly imitative of both older and younger models. Another possible model-based bias evident in the overimitation studies, perhaps related to an "expertise bias," is a "sex bias," in which female observers were more likely to copy causally irrelevant tool actions than male observers, particularly in instances where the model was also female, perhaps due to males being perceived as having more experience in operating tools, and, therefore, as more reliable models to copy. Alternatively, females may be more likely to conform due to higher levels of empathetic concern.
A crucial, as of yet unanswered question, is how these different biases interact to produce overimitation? It may be the case that the level at which these biases operate depends on the interaction between specific characteristics of the task, the model, and the observer. For example in the case of an adult observer viewing an adult model, the dominating bias is likely to be a "conformity bias," leading to high levels of overimitation. The tendency to conform may be particularly strong in instances where the task contains a sequence of causally irrelevant actions. As the irrelevant actions do not result in object retrieval it may appear to the observer that the sole purpose of the irrelevant element of the sequence is for them to imitate, making conformity extremely likely. However, this tendency toward overimitation may be curtailed somewhat by a "sex bias," (e.g., in instances where a female models tool actions for a male observer), whereas when an adult observer views a child model the dominating bias may be a model-based "expertise bias" with a "conformity bias" playing somewhat of a lesser role. In contrast, the situation with respect to 2-year-old observers is somewhat different as these children demonstrated little evidence of a "conformity bias" or an "expertise bias" emulating irrespective of the context or model age. This finding suggests that the dominant bias in this case is contentbased, with 2-year-old observers being more likely to learn the adaptive trait, perhaps due to their focus on task outcomes rather than on the model's actions, or their failure to read the intentionality of the model. Thus, the way in which different transmission biases interact is highly dependent on the developmental stage of the observer, the characteristics of the model and the task contents.
The proposed cultural learning hypothesis, which centers around the interaction between the transmission biases described above would appear, at least on the surface, to differ radically from the automaticity account proposed by Lyons et al., (2007 Lyons et al., ( , 2011 . There are, however, some similarities between the theories in that both propose that the cognitive architecture of humans is structured in such a way that copying the intentional actions performed by a model generally confers an advantage to the observer. However, where the theories appear to depart is in the rigidity of the copying process. The finding that overimitation can be influenced by characteristics of the protagonists, as well as box transparency, would appear to suggest that observers are not necessarily bound to copying the model. Instead it appears as though the various transmission biases allow observers to copy selectivity, an approach to social learning which would appear more powerful than automatically encoding all information as causally relevant.
A key question which remains for future research is the role of observer interpretation of the task goal. It could be argued that without providing participants with a clear aim to the experiment, the pattern of performance witnessed, particularly with respect to the current adult participants, revealed little about the nature of social learning; rather, the different approaches to the task simply stemmed from divergent interpretations of the purpose of the experiment. In the current, and indeed previous, overimitation studies researchers were interested in the spontaneous imitations performed; thus, the experimenter provided participants with little prior instruction as to the purpose of the experiment to prevent cueing of responses. It could be argued that the amount of overimitation witnessed would have been reduced had the participants been told that the goal of the task was to obtain the object. Although this possibility has yet to be explored with adult participants, instructions directly referring to reward retrieval have been used in child studies, for example in Horner and Whiten (2005) McGuigan et al., 2007) . It may be expected that the goal oriented instructions would lead participants to be more emulative and the more neutral instructions to lead to a more imitative approach; however, the task instructions appeared to have little impact as similarly high levels of overimitation have been witnessed across all of these studies. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the task goal, particularly by adult participants, clearly represents a thorny issue which studies of social learning should attempt to better address. The issue has been tackled directly with preschool participants by asking them to "quickly" check that the reward is ready for the next participant at the end of their own experimental session (Lyons et al., 2007) . Presenting this additional phase allows the participant to demonstrate more accurately the actions they believe are causally necessary for task completion. Intriguingly, the preschool children tested by Lyons et al. (2007) in this way continued to "overcopy." Whether or not adult participants would also do so is a question that begs further research.
Conclusions
Overall, the answer to the question of who, how, and why individuals overimitate is not a straightforward one, with perhaps the best answer lying in incorporating overimitation within a cultural evolutionary framework. With any instance of social learning, we have as a minimum, a model, an observer, and a cultural trait. Whether or not a trait is transmitted would appear to depend upon the interaction among the content of the trait, the characteristics of the model, and the characteristics of the observer. It would seem for the most part that humans become increasingly susceptible to a highly adaptive "conformity bias" as they age, while at the same time developing an increased ability to imitate selectively based on characteristics of the model. These "fast and frugal heuristics" provide the human species with an extremely powerful way to learn socially, which in most instances is highly adaptive. However, the generality of these heuristics can result in observers copying causally irrelevant actions, a tendency that on first glance appears maladaptive, but would in fact appear to be an overextension of a highly adaptive capacity for acquiring culture.
